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Ghana’s economic performance over the past 20 years can be described as a qualified success. 
Since 1986, real GDP has grown at an average of more than 4 percent per year, enabling per 
capita incomes to increase by a total of 30 percent between then and 2004. With rising 
incomes, there has been an associated decline in poverty: the incidence of food poverty has 
fallen from an estimated 37 percent of the population in 1991/92 to 27 percent in 1998/99 
(Ghana Statistical Service 2000). This performance is much better than that recorded 
elsewhere in Sub-Saharan Africa, where per capita incomes have on average remained static 
and poverty reduction has been sparse. On the other hand, it has done little more than return 
Ghana’s per capita income to the level at independence in 1957, and compares unfavourably 
with the faster pace of growth and poverty reduction in other regions, notably in Asia. 
Nevertheless, the stable state of the economy, linked to more than a decade of 
democratic government, contrasts sharply with the situation in the early 1980s, when the 
economy lay in ruins. Stryker (1990), in his contribution to the study led by Kruger, Schiff 
and Valdés (1988, 1991), notes that agricultural distortions played a key role in the 
disintegration of the Ghanaian economy. That study, which examined the evolution of 
agricultural policies and their consequences from the pre-independence period to the mid-
1980s, when liberalisation and structural adjustment were initiated, identifies the following 
sources of decline: chronic macroeconomic instability, increasing currency overvaluation, 
strict controls over the economy in general and the agricultural sector in particular, and 
ineffective state interventions. Mismanagement of the cocoa sector had a particularly 
damaging effect on Ghana’s economic performance. At the political level, there was great 
instability, with regime changes leading to policy reversals, and rent seeking by vested 
interests to such an extent that by 1983 the economy had effectively devoured itself and there 
were no more rents left to extract. 
This chapter aims to bring Stryker’s analysis up to the 21
st century. Since then, Ghana 
has followed IMF stabilisation and World Bank structural adjustment programs, and moved   3
into a “post-reform” phase where the effects of liberalising reforms are being digested and the 
benefits of further reforms are being queried. Over this period there have been numerous 
reviews of Ghana’s economy, and several examinations of agricultural policies and 
performance, including periodic World Bank reviews (the latest in 2000). However, since 
Stryker’s empirical analysis, which stops in 1985, there has been no comparable attempt to 
quantify agricultural policy distortions, assess their economic impacts, and put their 
importance in the context of Ghana’s broader development challenges. 
A general finding of the present analysis is that the profound policy distortions that 
characterized Ghana’s agricultural sector until 1984 have been reduced substantially. The 
exchange rate, which now floats, is no longer consistently overvalued, and trade policies are 
relatively even in their treatment of different sectors, with relatively uniform tariffs and 
logical exemptions, for example for inputs and products conducive to improved health and 
education. Improved macroeconomic and political stability and greater transparency in the 
policy process have meant that the prospects for agricultural development are much enhanced. 
Nevertheless, specific distortions still afflict Ghana’s agricultural sector. Import-competing 
sectors are protected by the standard tariff of 20 percent, while there is some implicit taxation 
of exports. In the case of cocoa, the marketing board’s share of the export price has risen with 
increases in the world market price, dampening incentives to invest. However, the main 
distortions lie not in the realm of explicit sectoral policies but in the way in which 
underdevelopment of physical infrastructure, weak credit markets, and stalled structural 
reforms (including to the country’s financial markets) hamper progress. 
Government spending on agriculture remains low, at consistently less than 2 percent 
of all public spending. The 2004 share  of just 1.3 percent contrasts with the target established 
in the Maputo Declaration of 2003, where African Heads of State and the Government 
committed themselves to increasing national expenditures on agriculture and rural 
development to 10 percent of all budgetary expenditures. There have been large increases in 
donor aid in recent years, with the net inflow of aid climbing from an average of 2.8 percent 
of GDP between 1996 and 2000 to 7.1 percent of GDP between 2001 and 2003, in part due to 
debt relief (Bank of Ghana 2005); but that aid has not been systematically targeted to 
agriculture.
1 As a complement to domestic spending, this injection provides real opportunities 
to remedy deficiencies in the functioning of both output and factor markets. The key 
challenge is to ensure that these monies are spent in suitable public investments, rather than in 
                                                 
1 The value of HIPC assistance was about half that of loans and grants in 2002-03. 
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measures that distort producers’ incentives by leading them to invest in agricultural activities 
without a sustainable future or which use purchased inputs excessively. 
With such reforms, agriculture can play its part in lifting Ghana’s growth rate from 
levels that barely exceed population growth to the 6-8 percent target established in Ghana’s 
revised Poverty Reduction Strategy (National Development Planning Commission 2005) that, 
it is estimated, would enable Ghana to achieve middle-income country status by 2015. 
 
 
Economic growth and structural changes  
 
 
Ghana’s economic development can be divided into four broad phases: the pre-independence 
period to 1957, the post-independence period from 1957 to 1983, the years of stabilisation and 
adjustment between 1983 and 1992, and the post-reform period from the elections of 1992 
onwards. 
 
Pre-independence (up to 1957) 
 
Agricultural policy prior to independence emphasised the production of export commodities 
(cocoa, coffee, oil palm, etc.) and paid little attention to non-commercial production or the 
development of staple food crops for domestic consumption. In general the emphasis of policy 
was on natural resource extraction, with minimal colonial oversight of other sectors of the 
economy. 
Some of the subsequent apparatus of government intervention, notably marketing 
boards, were established during this period. A particularly important institution, the Cocoa 
Marketing Board (CMB), was established by the colonial government during the Second 
World War, and became the monopoly buyer of cocoa at a fixed price paid to producers. Until 
1951, the majority of CMB profits were absorbed by the reserves of the board. In that year, 
however, taxes were raised and cocoa profits were diverted to general public investment. 
Internal self-government was ceded to Ghana in 1951, and the country’s first leader, 
Dr. Kwame Nkrumah attempted to foster rapid economic and social development by investing 
reserves that had accumulated during the Second World War and cocoa earnings that were 
boosted by the commodities boom induced by the Korean War. 
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Post-independence (1957-1983) 
 
Ghana’s economic performance after independence in 1957 was undermined by political 
instability, ideological splits and policy reversals. 
At independence in 1957, Ghana had one of the highest per capita incomes in Africa, 
placing it on a par with middle-income countries by today’s standards. The country was the 
world’s largest producer of cocoa and had external reserves that were equal to three years’ of 
imports. Cocoa prices began to decline significantly after 1957, yet the government continued 
to spend money on a large scale, even when revenues were lower, and from about 1961 
onwards became more heavily involved in central planning, rather than limiting spending to 
public goods. 
In 1961 the CMB was granted a monopoly on all purchases of cocoa from farmers in 
Ghana, replacing the existing network of private agents, traders, brokers and other 
middlemen. Despite falling cocoa prices, substantial increases in production as a result of new 
planting meant that Ghana’s export revenues remained relatively constant. Since production 
and marketing costs increased with the expansion of output, profits were squeezed and 
government revenues declined. With rising imports for public investment, the current account 
deteriorated and foreign exchange reserves dwindled. In response, foreign exchange controls 
and import licensing were introduced. From 1961, public spending shifted away from the 
provision of public goods towards the development of large state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
designed to substitute domestic production for imports. 
When world cocoa prices collapsed in the second half of 1964, the only way the 
government could meet its expenses was by printing money. This fuelled inflation and 
lowered real wages, thereby undermining support for the Nkrumah regime. 
Nkrumah’s government was ousted by a military coup in February 1966. By this time, 
per capita GDP was not much higher than in 1951. After a brief adjustment of policies, 
government was handed over to the democratically elected Busia (1969-71). He too was 
ousted by the military, whose (corrupt) rule and continued mismanagement of the economy 
further depressed real incomes between 1972 and 1979. The deteriorating economic and 
political situation eventually led to a coup by junior members of the armed forces, led by 
Flight-Lieutenant Jerry J. Rawlings. A brief return to civilian rule (1979-81), marked by 
ineffectiveness and allegations of corruption, was ended by Rawlings’ second coup and the 
establishment of the Provisional National Defence Council in 1981.  
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Rawlings’ government embarked initially upon a course of populist policies but after 
two years it became apparent that these policies would not arrest the country’s economic 
decline. In addition to the already serious economic and political situation, Ghana faced 
drought and bushfires in 1983 as well as the forced return of over 1 million Ghanaians from 
Nigeria. 
The nadir was reached in 1983. At the root of this collapse lay unsustainable levels of 
government expenditure, an increasingly overvalued exchange rate, import licensing, inflation 
and price controls and heavy state involvement in the running of the economy (Tsikata 1999, 
Leith and Söderling 2000). For example, in 1984 about 2.5 percent of the population was 
employed in the Civil Service, one of the highest ratios in Africa at the time. Public 
enterprises and boards employed another 2 percent. Preliminary audits conducted in 1986 
indicated that there were tens of thousands of ‘ghost workers’ on the public sector payroll 
(Alderman, Canagarajah and Younger 1993). Agricultural policy (discussed later) was 
fundamental to the dissolution of the Ghanaian economy. In particular, cocoa prices were 
falling, and the overvaluation of the cedi implied that the domestic currency equivalent of the 
f.o.b. price of cocoa was falling faster still, exacerbating the struggle between farmers and the 
government over cocoa revenue. This was further aggravated by the rising costs of the CMB 
and by the smuggling of cocoa to neighbouring countries where producer prices were much 
higher at the black market exchange rate (Stryker 1990). The result was a steadily 
deteriorating economic situation and widespread rent-seeking, which increasingly undermined 
Ghanaian institutions and society. 
By the early 1980s Ghana had been surpassed by at least half the countries of sub-
Saharan Africa in terms of per-capita GDP (Appendix Table 1). Government revenues fell 
from 15 percent of GDP in the early 1970s to 6 percent in 1982. Public sector wages fell by an 
average of 10 percent in real terms per year between 1975 and 1983. Export earnings fell to a 
low of 7 percent of GDP, and external financing dried up. Moreover, price controls led to 
much economic activity taking place in parallel markets, and to a general shortage of goods 
and services. 
 
Reform and adjustment (1983-92) 
 
The government responded by introducing a number of ad hoc programmes to deal with the 
emergencies and in April 1983, under the auspices of the IMF and the World Bank, initiated a 
program of economic stabilization and market reform, known as the Economic Recovery 
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Program (ERP). The reform strategy included a realignment of relative prices, the removal of 
direct controls and interventions, restored fiscal discipline, and the implementation of 
structural and institutional reforms. The ERP reinstated the necessary fundamentals for 
economic growth. In conjunction with increased inflows of external financing, real GDP rose 
by about 4 percent per year between 1983 and 1992. 
Of central importance to the ERP was exchange rate policy. By 1982 the cedi was 
estimated to have been overvalued by 1000 percent (Leechor 1994). In April 1983, the 
government established a multiple exchange rate system, which was abolished in October of 
the same year. Following a series of devaluations, a public auction system was established in 
1986 for most transactions not involving cocoa, petroleum and official debt service. In 
February 1987 the official and auction exchange rates were unified. Devaluation rapidly 
lowered the black market premium, and the introduction of foreign exchange auctions with a 
gradual move to a managed exchange rate virtually eliminated it by the 1990s. 
The budget was balanced by 1986, thanks to stronger government revenues deriving 
from exchange rate and tax reforms. With improved fiscal discipline, monetary growth was 
also kept in check, as the government had lower financing needs. Inflation was thus brought 
under control, falling from 123 percent in 1983 to 10 percent in 1992. But it was difficult to 
sterilise inflows of foreign assistance, which became increasingly important from the mid-
1980s onwards, and so inflation was not fully tamed. Moreover, fiscal and monetary 
discipline started to weaken in the run-up to elections in 1992. 
SOEs were a major area for reform. In the mid-1980s more than half of value added 
and employment was reported to be in SOEs. But reform proved more complex for both 
practical and political reasons, and not until 1990 were any sell-offs actually made. Similarly, 
financial reforms involved an evaluation of non-performing loans and a deregulation of credit 
and interest rates. However, the reform of rural banks proved difficult. 
Despite pursuing populist policies, the Rawlings government did not incur debt but, 
with the adoption of more orthodox economic management, foreign governments and 
multilateral agencies were increasingly eager to invest in Ghana. As a result, the ratio of debt 
to GDP increased from 41 percent at the outset of the ERP to 63 percent at the end of the 
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When democratic elections were held in 1992, several politically sensitive and 
administratively complex reforms remained unfinished, and became subject to the vagaries of 
electoral competition. These included the reform of the cocoa sector, the divestiture of state-
owned enterprises, and the establishment of effective tax collection and expenditure control 
systems for government (Leith and Söderling 2000). 
With civilian rule, government expenditures continued to rise and public deficit 
mounted. A significant share of this deficit was financed by printing money, which led to a 
surge in CPI inflation. From 1994 onwards there was also significant borrowing from abroad 
(more than 3 percent of GDP). Accordingly, the ratio of total external debt to GDP spiralled 
from 88 percent in 1994-96 to 119 percent in 2000-02, although by 2004 it was down to 80 
percent. Through the 1990s, debt service as a ratio of export earnings averaged 25-30 percent, 
which exceeds the 20-25 percent level that is deemed to be sustainable under the HIPC 
initiative. However, the ratio has dropped significantly since, and was down to 7 percent by 
2004 (World Bank 2006a). 
With a market-determined exchange rate, and a weakening fiscal position, the real 
exchange rate depreciated sharply (Table 1). This stimulated export growth, with the share of 
exports to GDP increasing to rates comparable to those in the 1960s before exchange controls 
started to bite from 1995. Yet the rapid depreciation of the real exchange rate had little 
dampening effect on imports, due to substantial financing of the government’s budget by 
transfers from foreign donors, foreign borrowing and a surge in private remittances. 
The government had difficulty in constraining the public deficit and, with limited 
domestic savings, the balance of payments deficit. VAT was introduced in 1986, only to be 
withdrawn shortly afterwards following protests. It was successfully reintroduced in 1998, but 
at a lower rate (10 percent compared with an original proposal of 17½ percent). The tax 
actually replaced a sales tax, but was on a broader base and was linked to improved record 
keeping and enhanced compliance. As a result, revenues ultimately increased. A constitutional 
amendment passed in 2002 has made it illegal for expenditures to exceed revenues by more 
than 10 percent. 
A structural problem arose when support for SOEs was removed, as the private sector 
did not have the capacity to fill the gap, and many systems collapsed. This raises the question 
of whether phased government withdrawal, via public-private partnerships, may not have 
been more appropriate. In that context, the initially slow pace of privatisation may have been 
a blessing. The divestiture of SOEs gathered pace in the 1990s, and has been favourably 
reviewed (Ghana Divestiture Implementation Committee 1997). 
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Only in the last few years have the non-performing assets of the economy been 
tackled. In 1998, 23 of the 133 rural banks that were in operation had their licenses withdrawn 
(Leith and Söderling 2000). But human capital remains a problem for rural banking, with the 
result that management is still often poor and rural banks continue to accumulate bad debts. 
Since 1992, there have been relatively minor modifications in trade policy. Ghana has 
a relatively simple tariff structure, comprising three rates: a low rate of 0 percent (with some 
items recently raised to 5 percent) reserved primarily for primary products, capital goods, and 
some basic consumer goods; a moderate rate of 10 percent applied primarily to other raw 
materials and intermediate inputs, as well as some consumer goods; and a higher rate of 20 
percent, mainly on final consumer goods. In addition there are several programs under which 
imports can be exempted from import duties, and manufacturers can apply for permission to 
import raw materials and intermediate inputs at concessionary duty rates. Zero rated goods 
account for an estimated 13.5 percent of imports (Haizel et al. 2002). In addition, Ghana does 
not differentiate between imported and locally-produced commodities in its domestic indirect 
taxes, so there are no distortions in this area. 
In 1999, Bajracharya and Flatters (1999) argued for more comprehensive tariff 
reforms, suggesting that additional revenues could be obtained by tightening exemptions, 
adjusting the tariff rate structure, and administrative reform. They concluded that the greatest 
potential for revenue improvement, as well as significantly enhanced trade facilitation, was 
most likely to be found in administrative reform of customs and related procedures, 
suggesting that revenue increases of 20 percent were possible (on a base which includes 
import-related excises and VAT as well as import duties). Inspection agencies charge a 1 
percent fee for these services, and an ECOWAS customs duty of 0.5 percent is levied on 
imports from non-ECOWAS countries. 
In a subsequent review undertaken for DFID (Haizel et al. 2002) it was similarly 
concluded that low tariffs could enable Ghana to abolish the duty drawback and would help 
ensure fairness, transparency, consistency and efficiency in customs administration. They also 
noted the need to improve port clearance and turnaround time, a point reinforced in a World 
Bank study (World Bank 2006b) which notes that it takes an average of 55 days for imported 
goods to clear customs and reach factory warehouses, and an average of 47 days for exports to 
leave the factory and clear the port of exit. This is much higher than the efficient benchmark 
(five days for exports and imports in Denmark), but also substantially higher than the 
recorded times in Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, Togo and Nigeria. 
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In overall terms, the current policy environment in Ghana contrasts sharply with that 
prevailing up to 1983. Yet policy reforms have not been fully consolidated, nor have they 
been accompanied by the structural reforms needed to make them work. As a result there has 
been some reform fatigue, and, unfortunately, some questioning of the process itself, rather 




Growth has held steady at about 4-5 percent per year (Appendix Figure 1). With population 
increasing at 2½ percent per year, this has translated into per capita income growth of 2-3 
percent per year over the past 20 years. 
With such growth rates it is estimated that it would take 30-40 years to eradicate 
absolute poverty in Ghana (Hadjimichael et al. 1996). Indeed, 20 years of 4-5 percent growth 
has done little more than bring per capita incomes back to the levels enjoyed nearly 50 years 
ago, when Ghana attained independence (Appendix Figure 2). Recent economic performance 
has been more robust, with real GDP growth reaching 5.8 percent in 2004, a percentage point 
above the average for 2001-03. Agriculture was the strongest component of overall growth, 
with particularly strong production growth in the cocoa sector (which has benefited from 
government sponsored disease control programs). 
Inflation rebounded in the 1990s, reaching 60 percent in 1995 and 25 percent in 2000 
as the government failed to contain budget deficits (Appendix Figure 3). The government's 
overall fiscal deficit worsened to 8.2 percent of GDP in 2000, and the current account deficit 
deteriorated to 10.6 percent of GDP. The real effective exchange rate reached a corresponding 
low in 2000 and has remained relatively stable since then. A particular problem has been 
fiscal profligacy in election years, and government responsiveness to special interest groups, 
such as doctors, Cocoa Board members, railway employees and civil servants (Leite et al. 
1999). The failure to consolidate macroeconomic stability has undermined investment and, 
with it, the country’s long term growth. 
Ghana’s trade performance has improved considerably since the mid-1980s. In 
response to lower taxation and fewer controls, exports grew at an average of 10 percent per 
year between 1984 and 1994, while imports grew at a similar pace. This enabled the share of 
exports in GDP to recover from an average of 6 percent in 1981-85 to more than 20 percent in 
the 1990s and over 40 percent between 2001 and 2004 (Table 1). 
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Following reform, the strongest performing sectors were mining, utilities, construction 
and most services, in particular transport and the wholesale/retail sector. Manufacturing grew 
rapidly in the 1984-86 period but its rate of growth has since fallen below the economy’s 
overall rate. More recently, non-traditional exports – mainly processed and semi-processed 
goods – have become increasingly important. Exports of non-traditional goods (both 
agricultural and non-agricultural) increased from US$24 million in 1986 to $402 million in 
1998, and $636 million in 2005, their share of total exports growing from about 5 percent to 
more than 25 percent over this period. 
Reforms have been complemented by increased aid flows and migrant remittances. 
Total aid flows jumped significantly between 1989 and 1992 as donors aimed to support 
institution building activities in the run-up to the multi-party elections set for 1992 (Tsikata 
1999). More recently they have climbed again, as part of a concerted effort to accelerate 
growth in Sub-Saharan Africa (Appendix Figure 4). Private remittances exceed the combined 
total of official transfers, official capital and private capital flows, amounting to $1.3 billion, 
or 15 percent of GDP in 2004 (IMF 2005), and reportedly exceeding $3 billion in 2005. 
Ghana’s varied economic fortunes have been reflected in the performance and relative 
importance of the agricultural sector. As the economy collapsed, agriculture assumed an 
important buffer role, its share of GDP rising to 60 percent in the early 1980s. Since then, 
agriculture’s relative importance has declined, conforming to the general pattern whereby 
economic development is accompanied by a shift of resources to non-agricultural activities. 
Yet at one-third of national income, agriculture is still almost as important as it was 40 years 
previously (Appendix Figure 5). Agricultural growth was, equivalently, slower than growth in 
other sectors, partly reflecting the aforementioned shift of resources between sectors, and 
partly as a consequence of lower commodity prices. Since 2001, agricultural growth has on 




On the basis of the Ghana Living Standards Survey (GLSS) data, and a food poverty line set 
at the estimated annual expenditure per person required to meet minimum nutritional 
requirements, the poverty incidence in Ghana fell from 37 percent in 1991/92 to 27 percent in 
1998/99. Given the rise in the population numbers, this means a drop from 5.8 to 5.0 million 
people faced with food-poverty. Christiaensen, Demery and Paternostro (2002) report 
consumption poverty indices for 1992 and 1998 of 51 and 39 percent respectively, based on 
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the food intake required to meet a minimum caloric intake with adjustments for essential non-
food consumption.  
There are large rural and regional differences in poverty levels and their changes. 
Poverty has fallen steeply in Greater Accra and other regions but has increased in the Central, 
Northern and Upper East regions (Appendix Table 2). At the national level, the reduction in 
poverty was almost entirely due to economic growth. The overall redistribution effect was 
negligible, although it played an important role in the Accra region where reduced inequality 
helped reduce poverty significantly (IMF 2000). Worsening inequality elsewhere, especially 
in the urban coastal region, offset this positive development. 
The ERP and the resulting economic growth led to significant improvements for 
households engaged in export farming and for those in formal employment, in both the public 
and private sectors. Households in the food crop farming sector continued to perform worst, 
with the incidence of food poverty falling from about 52 to 45 percent for this group over the 
1991/92 to 1998/99 period (Appendix Table 3). By 1998/99, households in the food crop 
farming sector accounted for 65 percent of national poverty, up from 62 percent in 1991/92. 
These developments reflect the fact that the ERP benefited primarily export-oriented farmers. 
Outside the export sector agriculture grew sluggishly and, with weaker income growth and 
fewer non-farm income-earning opportunities, this negatively impacted on the welfare of food 
crop farmers. 
In the northern parts of the country (Northern and Upper Regions), where most 
farmers are dependent on food crop farming, poverty worsened as a result of lower 
agricultural and off-farm earnings.  
 
 
Agricultural policies in Ghana 
 
 
Agricultural policies in Ghana have formed an important part of the general setting of policy, 
and shifts in sectoral policy have generally matched reorientations in overall policy. In 
particular, policy towards the cocoa sector has gone through dramatic changes, which have 
had a hugely important impact on Ghana’s collapse and subsequent recovery.  
Ghana’s agricultural policies prior to 1983 are thoroughly described by Stryker (1990, 
1991). They included price controls, input and credit subsidies, obligatory credit allocations, 
and heavy state involvement in production, distribution and marketing. As with economic 
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policy in general, 1983 saw a completely new approach to agricultural policies. The 
government privatised state farms, removed price controls and gradually reduced subsidies on 
inputs such as fertilizer. In 1990 the government removed the guaranteed minimum price paid 
to farmers for selected food crops (mainly maize and rice) and in 1992 abolished input 
subsidies altogether. 
Prior to reforms, procurement was facilitated through the Agricultural Development 
Board, which was set up in the 1960s, and was responsible for buying maize and rice at 
guaranteed prices and storing them in an effort to stabilise prices. This organization was 
superseded by the Ghana Food Distribution Corporation (GFDC), which was established in 
1975 and dissolved in 1987. On average the GFDC bought less than 5 percent of the maize 
and rice produced in the country, its effectiveness constrained by a lack of storage facilities 
and weak infrastructure (Puplampu 1999). 
In 1986-88 the government drafted a new agricultural policy: the ‘Ghana Agricultural 
Policy: Action Plan and Strategies 1986-88.’ Key objectives outlined in this initiative were: 
self-sufficiency in cereals, starchy staples and animal protein food, with priority for maize, 
rice and cassava in the short term; maintenance of adequate buffer stocks for price 
stabilization and food security during shortfalls; and improving institutional facilities such as 
research, credit and marketing. However, putting these objectives into practice proved 
difficult, in part due to the weak institutional capacity of the country. 
The GOG, in collaboration with the World Bank, consequently embarked on the 
‘Agricultural Services Rehabilitation Project (ASRP)’ over the 1987-1990 period. The main 
objectives of the project were to strengthen the institutional framework for formulating and 
implementing agricultural policies and programmes, improve the delivery of public sector 
services, and improve the procurement and distribution of agricultural inputs by way of 
privatisation.  
The ASRP project did succeed in strengthening the capacity of agricultural research, 
extension, irrigation and policy planning institutions. To build on these short-term 
improvements, the government, with support from the World Bank, decided to implement a 
more strongly resourced medium-term program, focusing on the key areas of agricultural 
research, extension, livestock, fisheries development and export promotion. The ‘Medium 
Term Agricultural Development Program (MTADP)’ covered the 1991-2000 period and was 
broadly aimed at increasing productivity and competitiveness in the agricultural sector. A 
number of stand-alone projects were launched under MTADP such as the ‘National 
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Agricultural Research Program’ (NARP), the ‘National Agricultural Extension Program’ 
(NAEP), and the ‘Fisheries Capacity Building Project’ (FSCBP).  
Despite the increased attention given to agriculture, growth in the sector remained 
relatively sluggish throughout the 1980s and also in the first half of the 1990s. The much 
improved performance in the second half of the 1990s was largely a result of the improved 
macroeconomic environment. Structural weaknesses – inadequate roads, poor access to 
markets, inappropriate agricultural practices, low technology, etc. – were and (despite some 
improvements) remain key constraints to growth. 
In 2003, MOFA developed a ‘Food and Agriculture Sector Development Policy’ 
(FASDEP). The objectives of this programme include food security, poverty reduction, 
supplying raw materials to industry and ensuring the sector’s continued contribution to GDP, 
foreign exchange and government revenue. Reflecting the market orientation of government 
policies more generally, the private sector is seen to be the main engine that will deliver on 
these objectives. The main break with the past is FASDEP’s focus on a sector-wide approach 
to agricultural development, contrasting with the discrete project approach pursued in the past. 
FASDEP is expected to contribute to Ghana’s Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS) via 
infrastructure development, the promotion of appropriate technologies, and improved 
extension services.  
However, a Poverty and Social Impact Assessment (PSIA) of the strategic objectives 
for agricultural policy criticised FASDEP as a one-size-fits-all policy that does not take 
account of the diverse needs of different stakeholders in the agricultural sector, notably the 
very poor and women. Accordingly, a broader revision of FASDEP is underway. This 
involves spelling out more clearly what a sector-wide approach entails, providing guidance 
for a six-year policy plan, and achieving consensus among stakeholders (including donors) 




The government’s policy towards cocoa, the country’s biggest export earner, has been a major 
component of its overall economic policy, and has changed along with the general orientation 
of economic policy over time. 
Ghana became the world’s leading producer of cocoa by 1911 (a position it retained 
until the mid-1970s), and by 1920/21 produced 32 percent of world cocoa output. Production 
has always been small-farm based (there are about 1.6 million smallholder farmers growing 
  14  15
cocoa, mostly on plots of 3 hectares or less) with plantations never having been of much 
importance. Until the Second World War internal and external marketing were handled by 
private firms, but during the war the colonial government took over the purchase of cocoa, 
selling it to the British Food Ministry (Leith and Söderling 2000). In 1947 the Cocoa 
Marketing Board (CMB) was established, with a monopoly over internal and external 
marketing. The influence of the CMB in the cocoa industry (after 1979 called The Ghana 
Cocoa Board or COCOBOD) was pervasive and covered extension services, input marketing, 
and the maintenance and rehabilitation of roads in cocoa-producing villages.  
While initially set up to protect farmers from price volatility, the CMB gradually 
turned into an instrument of public taxation (Stryker 1990). Rents were extracted by keeping 
producer prices well below the world price, and by using an over-valued exchange rate to 
make payments to farmers. Inefficiency, corruption, the increasingly poor state of roads and 
the shortage of spare parts meant that costs accounted for an increasingly large proportion of 
the f.o.b. price. In 1981/82 the black market exchange rate was 44 times the official rate and 
CMB costs exclusive of the price paid to producers exceeded the f.o.b. sales at the official 
exchange rate. Even after the cedi/US dollar exchange rate was devalued from 2.75 to 90 in 
1985-86, CMB costs still accounted for 28 percent of the total value of sales (Stryker 1990).  
Between 1967 and 1977, the system for purchasing and marketing cocoa gradually 
broke down as the economic situation deteriorated. By 1981/82 the amount of unshipped 
cocoa was about one-half of that harvested. Smuggling had also become increasingly 
attractive, with an estimated 20 percent of the crop being smuggled out of the country in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s. Output had stagnated following independence, but started falling 
from the early 1970s onwards. Falling world cocoa prices from the late 1970s, ageing trees, 
widespread disease and poor weather (bush fires in 1983 destroyed some 60,000 hectares 
under cocoa) also contributed to the decline.
2
Production dropped from an average of 450,000 tons to a low of 159,000 tons in the 
1983-84 growing season, when the crop was just 28 percent of the peak 1964-65 crop. 
Ghana’s share of the world market fell accordingly, from 36 percent in 1965 to 17 percent in 
the early 1980s. It is worth noting that, as a result of strengthening world prices, export 
revenues remained steady initially – a factor which helped successive governments avoid 
painful reforms. The key sources of decline over the longer term were the overvalued 
                                                 
2 In 1983/84 farmers were provided with seedlings to replace trees lost in the drought and trees more than 30 
years old (about one quarter of all trees). 
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exchange rate and high taxation, effected by means of a monopsonistic marketing board (Teal 
and Vigneri 2004). By 1983, cocoa farmers received only 21 percent of the f.o.b. price.  
The mid-1980s saw the implementation of the Economic Recovery Programme, with 
agricultural policy focused on improving the terms-of-trade for cocoa. Producer prices rose in 
part because the government raised the farmer’s share in cocoa earnings to 40 percent by 
1994/95 and 50 percent by 2000/01 (ADB 2002). In addition, falling inflation helped boost 
real producer prices. By 1987/88 real producer prices had increased threefold from their low 
of 1983/84. Producer prices were also strengthened by squeezing COCOBOD’s share in 
cocoa revenues from 30 percent to 15 percent of the f.o.b. price. While the share of the 
producer price in the world price has fluctuated in recent years, the real producer price has 
increased steadily, helping to raise COCOBOD purchases and exports (Figure 1). 
Efforts to improve the efficiency of COCOBOD led to wide-ranging changes to its 
structure and activities. Transport of cocoa shifted to the private sector after 1984, while 
responsibility for cocoa feeder roads shifted to the Department of Feeder Roads, Ministry of 
Roads and Highways. A Cocoa Rehabilitation Project was initiated in 1987 with donor 
funding (ADB 2002). From 1988/89 COCOBOD began phasing out input subsidies and, over 
a relatively short period of time, this led to a substantial increase in input prices. However, 
following pressure from farmer organizations, the government reduced the price of 
insecticides and fungicides in 1994.  
It was not until after the 1992 elections that reform of COCOBOD gained momentum. 
Major changes introduced were a reduction in staff levels from over 100,000 in the early 
1980s to 10,400 in 1995 and just over 5,100 staff by 2003, an end to input marketing, and the 
introduction of competition into internal marketing. Licensed Buying Companies (LBCs) 
were set up to compete with the Produce Buying Company (PBC). By 1995/96 the PBC’s 
share of purchases had declined to 80 percent and by 2000/01 to 37 percent. Monopsonistic 
price setting by COCOBOD remains in place.
3 Liberalization of COCOBOD’s export 
monopoly started in 2000/01 and LBCs can now export 30 percent of their cocoa purchases 
directly to external buyers. However, a minimum tonnage requirement has meant that only 9 
LBCs qualified and none actually marketed externally.  
                                                 
3 Cocoa producer prices (and related rates and fees in cocoa purchasing and marketing) are fixed by the Producer 
Price Review Committee (PPRC) made up of representatives of the cocoa farmers, licensed cocoa buyers, cocoa 
haulers, the Ministry of Finance (the Minister of Finance is the chairman of the PPRC), the Bank of Ghana, the 
Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research of the University of Legon, and COCOBOD officials.  
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The reforms have had an impact. In 2004, the cocoa sector accounted for 7.8 percent 
of GDP and contributed 21 percent of exports. Strong growth in the cocoa sector has been 
primarily due to government assistance and favourable weather conditions. The former 
includes free mass spraying of cocoa farms, which has reduced the incidence of pests and 
diseases, especially black pod, swollen shoot disease and capsid insect attack; a steady 
increase in the farmer’s share of the export price; rehabilitation and replanting of old farms 
with new varieties; and road rehabilitation work in cocoa growing areas, which facilitated 
transport and reduced costs (USDA 2005, ISSER 2005). The public dissemination of higher-
productivity, faster-maturing tree varieties played an especially important role in helping 
farmers respond to the new policy environment (Edwin and Masters 2005).  
The growth of Ghanaian cocoa exports also reflects the influx of cocoa smuggled from 
Côte d’Ivoire, partly as a result of that country’s civil conflict. The inflow is estimated to have 
been between 120,000 to 150,000 metric tons in 2003/04. However, cocoa from Côte d’Ivoire 
is of inferior quality and the smuggling may have contributed to a fall in the premium that 
Ghanaian cocoa receives – typically between $50 and $80 per ton – to about $20 per ton. 
Maintaining quality is the responsibility of the COCOBOD’s Quality Control Division which 
carries out inspection, grading and sealing of cocoa for the international and local markets.  
Of increasing economic importance are exports of processed cocoa products, in 
particular cocoa butter, liquor, powder and cocoa cake. In 2004/05 Ghana had a processing 
capacity of 145,000 metric tons, and export earnings from these products tripled between 
1992-94 and 2002-04 from $32 million (about the level achieved in the early 1970s) to $102 
million (FAOSTAT).  
The GOG’s policy with regard to producer prices is to reach a level of 70 percent of 
the world price. Price distortions persist partly because producer prices are not allowed to 
adjust quickly in response to upward movements in world prices. Cocoa supply is expected to 
increase gradually, especially if price incentives are coupled with improved husbandry 
techniques, pest control and adequate transportation infrastructure. The LBC’s ability to 
generate competition has yet to be determined. Seini (2002) reports that these companies 
rarely pay more than the government producer price. Moreover, their role in the export market 
is limited by their inability to operate beyond a minimum scale. However, support for full 
liberalization of the sector is also limited by concerns over quality – an issue in which both 
producers and buyers have a stake. 
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Measuring distortions to agricultural incentives 
 
 
It is clear from the above discussion that government policies have had a strong impact on the 
price incentives facing producers in Ghana. This section assesses the extent of those price 
distortions over the past half century. Our focus is on government-imposed distortions that 
create a gap between actual domestic prices and what those prices would be under free 
markets (Anderson et al. 2008). Since it is not possible to understand the characteristics of 
agricultural development with a sectoral view alone, the project’s methodology not only 
estimates the effects of direct agricultural policy measures (including distortions in the foreign 
exchange market), but it also generates estimates of distortions facing non-agricultural 
producers for comparative evaluation.
 More specifically, this study computes a Nominal Rate 
of Assistance (NRA) for farmers. It also generates an NRA for nonagricultural tradables, 
which can be compared with the rate for agricultural tradables via the calculation of a Relative 
Rate of Assistance (RRA).  
Price distortions are measured for four tradable crops: cocoa, rice, maize and 
groundnuts. In addition, the presence or absence of support for three non-traded or lightly 
traded staples (cassava, yams and plantains) is assessed as well. Collectively, these seven 
crops account for more than 70 percent of the value of agricultural production in Ghana 
(Figure 2).
4
The commodities are diverse in terms of their net trade position. Cocoa is Ghana’s 
main agricultural export; rice is the main imported food commodity; maize has traditionally 
been imported but there has been an exportable surplus in some recent years; and groundnuts 
were for many years not traded internationally but became a significant export in the 1990s. 
Cocoa, rice and maize were included in Stryker’s analysis, which considered the period up to 
1985, and found evidence of extensive distortions in all three sectors. 
In the case of cocoa, the sector was heavily mismanaged, and only a minor share of the 
export price was returned to the producer (Appendix Figure 6(a)). There was some reduction 
                                                 
4 For rice and maize, international reference prices are converted into local currency at the black market 
exchange rate, on the assumption that importers must obtain hard currency at that price. Note that maize has been 
exported in some recent years, but by then the official and black market exchange rates had converged. 
Conversely, producers of cocoa beans and groundnuts are assumed to have been obliged to convert their foreign 
currency earnings into cedis at the official exchange rate but implicitly allowed to sell half their foreign currency 
earnings on the parallel market. In order to measure the extent of exchange rate distortions, and to gauge the 
sensitivity of the NRAs to the particular choice of exchange rate, all NRAs are computed at an estimated 
equilibrium exchange rate corresponding to a weighted average of the official and black market rates (see 
Anderson and Martin for a discussion). 
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in COCOBOD’s share of export earnings in the 1990s, but as cocoa prices have strengthened 
in recent years that share has risen again. Export tax payments made by COCOBOD to the 
government declined from an average of 40-50 percent of FOB earnings during the mid-1990s 
to less than 10 percent by 2004. This has further allowed COCOBOD to increase its retained 
share of the export price, with the result that there has been a much milder reduction in the 
implicit taxation of the Ghanaian producer (Appendix Figure 6(b) and 6(c)).  
Prior to the mid-1980s, rice producers received less than the imported price (at the 
farm-gate) suggesting some implicit taxation, while maize producers’ prices were at a similar 
level to imported prices (again compared at the farm-gate) (Appendix Figure 7(a) and 8(a)). In 
both cases, domestic prices increased sharply in the mid-1980s, but the degree of price 
protection to producers has since diminished to levels somewhat higher than the statutory 
import tariff of 20 percent (Appendix Figure 7(b) and 8(b)). The evidence for rice and maize 
thus points to significant protection of import-competing commodities. In the case of 
groundnuts, producers have received slightly less than the export f.o.b. price in recent years, 
as the product has become a significant export (Appendix Figure 8). There is no evidence of 
direct policy interventions in the markets for staples such as cassava, yams and plantains. 
These observations are reflected in Table 2, which shows NRAs for the four tradable 
crops computed at an estimated “equilibrium” exchange rate. Protection for import-competing 
crops (rice and maize) declined in the second half of the 1990s but has re-emerged in recent 
years.
5 Dis-protection (i.e. taxation) of exports of cocoa beans declined steadily until the latter 
1980s. Further reforms through the 1990s lowered the rate of implicit export taxation to less 
than 20 percent. 
Figure 3 shows that history back to 1955 but grouping products according to their net 
trade status.
6 Importable crops were effectively taxed prior to the economic collapse of the 
early 1980s. From the period of adjustment until the 1992 elections, significant protection was 
provided, with the NRA averaging over 60 percent. This protection was mostly dismantled in 
the 1990s, but those reforms have not been secured. Exports of cocoa beans were heavily 
taxed in the years between independence and the crisis that precipitated reforms and 
adjustment (1958 to 1982). The tendency to tax exportables has diminished over time, but 
remains significant, with an NRA averaging close to -20 percent in the period 1995-2004. 
When non-tradables are factored in, the overall pattern is one of very low net taxation of 
                                                 
5 Maize was exported between 1996 and 1999. Given the absence of export subsidies, import protection was 
therefore redundant in these years. 
6 Data for 1983 are dropped from the analysis. In this year the economy and trade collapsed, and domestic and 
international price comparisons are not reliable. 
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agriculture prior to independence in 1957, heavy net taxation in the post-independence period, 
and an overall balance declining to almost zero in recent years. This net balance masks a 
consistent tendency to tax exports and protect imports. 
For much of the post-independence period, exchange rate distortions have had an 
important impact on producers’ incentives. Based on the assumed equilibrium exchange rate, 
the cedi was overvalued by 13 percent between 1958 and 1982, with the degree of 
overvaluation falling to 8 percent between 1984 and 1992. This taxed producers of 
exportables, and increased the degree of price protection provided to import-competing 
products. In the case of cocoa beans, exchange rate overvaluation accounts for a significant 
share of implicit taxation prior to 1992. For import-competing products, the net taxation prior 
to the crisis would have been more severe but for overvaluation, while some of the high 
protection provided between 1984 and 1992 is explained by overvaluation. From 1992 
onwards, the foreign exchange market functioned freely, so the NRA estimates reflect direct 
sector-specific distortions. 
Continued protection of non-agricultural sectors has reinforced the discrimination 
against exportables throughout the period analysed and provided disincentives for producers 
of non-tradables. Non-agricultural protection also added to the bias against import-competing 
products in the period prior to the crisis when they were effectively taxed, and dampened the 
degree of protection provided in subsequent years. These impacts are reflected in the 
differences between the NRAs and RRAs (Table 3) and are illustrated in Figure 4. 
The final rows of Table 3 show what the key indicators would be had exchange rate 
distortions not been taken into account. Those numbers reinforce the point made above that 
the exchange rate distortions contributed very significantly to agriculture’s overall negative 
NRA, and to the negative RRA from the 1960s to the 1980s. 
 
Market deficiencies affecting the agricultural sector 
 
Ghana’s agricultural sector also suffers heavily from implicit distortions in the form of market 
underdevelopment. In particular, transport costs are high (prohibitively so for many small 
scale farmers with a potential surplus to sell), while credit is expensive, with formal interest 
rates of 25 percent or more, and effectively unavailable for most producers without 
established links to international markets. Moreover, there are few signs of improvement in 
Ghana’s social infrastructure and in the development of human capital. Less than 18 percent 
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of the country’s roads are paved and their condition has deteriorated over recent years (World 
Bank 2006a), while the country’s railway network is almost non-functional (OECD 2003). 
One positive development for farmers is the advent of mobile phone use, with usage 
increasing from 6.6 users per 1000 population in 2000 to 78.2 per thousand in 2004. Health 
and education show few signs of improvement. Public health expenditures declined from 1.9 
percent of GDP in 2000 to 1.4 percent in 2003 (World Bank 2006a). There have been 
improvements in male and female literacy in the past 25 years, but the rate of improvement 
has stalled and there are concerns about the quality of both primary and secondary education, 
and the particularly low rate of primary school enrolment in northern rural areas. 
 
 
The determinants of policy changes 
 
 
Prior to the adoption of liberalizing reforms in 1983, any attempts by the government to 
influence farmers’ incentives through price policy were ineffective, as they could not offset 
the huge distortions deriving from the conjunction of high inflation and a fixed exchange rate. 
Accordingly the government tried to influence the allocation of resources through import 
licensing, exchange controls, marketing board operations, input distribution and the direct 
allocation of credit. It also pursued agricultural development through specific projects and 
public investments. This policy environment created enormous scope for arbitrage between 
informal markets and formal, government controlled channels, and led to rent-seeking on a 
massive scale. A strong bias developed in favor of large farmers with contacts and influence. 
As Stryker puts it: “government regulations were subverted, graft and corruption were 
rampant, and patron-client relations became entrenched as the principal means by which most 
people could gain access to scarce goods and services” (Stryker 1991, p. 116). It also 
subverted political representation and activity as a means of receiving favorable policy 
treatment. 
Rawlings came to power as a populist leader dedicated to cleaning up government, but 
his attempts to reduce rent-seeking were counterproductive, as they did not deal with the 
fundamental problem of distorted incentives. However, once a decision was made to liberalize 
the economy and reduce price distortions, the incentives for rent-seeking diminished. 
From 1983 onwards, the imperative was to resurrect the Ghanaian economy, and the 
government signed up to IMF and World Bank-led programs. The international financial 
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institutions thus played a key role in policy setting through the remainder of the 1980s, via the 
ERP and subsequent structural adjustment program. National lenders, as joint underwriters of 
reform, also had significant input. 
As ODA increased in the run-up to national elections in 1992, the influence of national 
lenders increased. While lenders and donors broadly supported the macroeconomic tenets of 
reform and adjustment, they had a specific interest in ensuring that money was spent on 
worthwhile projects and public investments. This meant additional focus on the 
microeconomics of development policies, as well as macroeconomic distortions and price 
incentives. This reorientation coincided with a refinement of orthodox policy thinking in the 
1990s, with undistorted price signals seen as a necessary but by no means sufficient pre-
requisite for economic development. Outside the IFIs, a number of lenders and NGOs started 
to argue for a fresh look at infant industry arguments for agricultural protection in developing 
countries. 
Until recently, agriculture was neglected by donors. And while there is a formal 
recognition of the need to devote more resources to agricultural development, this has not so 
far been reflected in the ODA statistics. 
By contrast, the WTO has had little direct impact on trade policy formulation in 
Ghana. As a signatory to the GATT, Ghana was a founding member of the WTO, and acceded 
with “least developed country” status. Accordingly, it established ceiling bindings of 99.5 
percent on agricultural tariffs. Moreover, Ghana’s highest applied rate now stands at 20 
percent, meaning that there is currently scope to increase tariffs. 
In general terms, while policies in Ghana are far from being fully liberalized, it is 
more than 20 years since the most profound policy distortions were removed. Since then, 
Ghana’s economy has recovered, but the pace of growth – and associated poverty reduction – 
has been disappointing compared with the experience of other developing countries outside 
Africa. Under such circumstances there are two alternative views, which reflect a controversy 
about the policies needed to stimulate growth in Africa more generally: one that liberalizing 
reform needs to be pushed through all the way, but accompanied by more effective policies to 
facilitate adjustment and improve competitiveness; the other that the process of liberalization 
itself should be addressed selectively and with circumspection. While the experience of 
massive intervention left such policies totally discredited, there is a divergence of views, both 
within Ghana and among donors, on the direction that policy should now take. 
In agriculture, the experience with FASDEP, GPRS, and their associated review 
mechanisms illustrates the difficulty of achieving consensus among stakeholders when few of 
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those stakeholders hold to ideological certainties. One important issue is that agriculture is 
affected by policies in other sectors, where reforms have also lost momentum. In particular, 
further reforms to financial markets could help increase the flow of credit into the farm sector. 
 
 
Prospects and policy options 
 
 
Ghana’s major current challenge is to choose appropriate investments that can raise 
productivity and raise growth from the 4-5 percent of the last 20 years to the 6-8 percent 
target set out in the GPRS. In the 50 years since independence, Ghana’s growth has been 
circumscribed by currency overvaluation, excessive state interventions, excess demand (and 
repeated painful adjustments), discrimination against sectors in which the country holds a 
comparative advantage (notably cocoa), and suppression of the financial sector. Of these 
problems, the first two – heavily emphasised in Stryker’s examination of Ghana’s trade, 
exchange rate and agricultural policies through to the mid-1980s – have essentially been dealt 
with. Progress on the latter three has been positive but more fitful. In short, Ghana has not 
fully addressed the policy deficiencies that have constrained growth for half a century. On the 
other hand, the transition to a stable democracy has made policy-making a more transparent 
and consistent process, itself a major accomplishment. 
The present study shows that policy biases have been reduced, but not eliminated: 
import-competing producers continue to receive significant protection, and COCOBOD 
continues to extract significant rents from farmers. However, there appears to be little appetite 
for fully eliminating distortions, due to concerns about the ability of farmers to compete, and 
about the implications of further tariff reductions for government revenue. Greater emphasis 
is, arguably with good reason, attached to boosting investments that can address structural 
weaknesses and thereby improve competitiveness and reduce poverty.  
A difficulty with this approach – and one identified in the Poverty and Social Impact 
Assessment of FASDEP – is that policies which improve competitiveness generally may not 
be pro-poor, either because they are geared towards the most viable farmers, or because they 
intensify competitive pressures and the gap between modern commercial producers and 
traditional farmers. Thus, current policy debate, as in many other African countries, revolves 
around how to reconcile structural adjustment with poverty reduction.  
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There are some broad principles that should be able to guide policy design in Ghana. 
First, there is a need to address the structural weaknesses that impede development. These 
include a weak manufacturing sector, including in agriculture-related industries such as food 
processing, and a lack of outward orientation in potential export sectors. These weaknesses 
derive in part from deficient investment in public goods, such as transport systems and 
education and training, and from market failures that are inherently correctable (for example 
in the financial sector). Agriculture is also plagued by specific structural problems, including 
small and fragmented agricultural land holdings, weak farm level organization (notably a lack 
of grassroots institutions), unsuitable technologies, and a dearth of agricultural lending. These 
are key areas where government intervention, specifically to correct market failures, could be 
of benefit. The importance of, indeed the relevance of, eliminating Ghana’s outstanding 
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Figure 2: Product composition of agricultural production, Ghana, 1966 to 2003 
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Figure 3: Nominal rates of assistance to exportables, import-competing and all
a agricultural 












1955 1958 1961 1964 1967 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003







Source: Authors’ spreadsheet 
a. The total NRA can be above or below the exportable and import-competing averages 
because assistance to nontradables and non-product specific assistance is also included. 
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Figure 4: Nominal rates of assistance to all nonagricultural tradables, all agricultural tradable 
industries, and relative rates of assistance
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t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the agricultural and 
nonagricultural sectors, respectively. 
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Table 1: Trade and exchange rate performance, Ghana, 1966 to 2004 
 
  1966-1970 1971-1975 1976-1980 1981-1985 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2004 
Exports of goods and services ( percent of GDP)  19 19 11 7 18 21 36 41
Exports of goods and services (annual percent growth)  -1.9 -2.8 -7.9 -1.6 9.2 7.1 12.3 1.1
Trade ( percent of GDP)  39 38 22 14 42 53 87 97
Official exchange rate (LCU per US$, period average)  0.9 1.2 1.9 21 208 722 2825 8196
Real effective exchange rate index (2000 = 100)  na na 802 1306 190 139 137 101
Black market premium ( percent)  72 35 367 1289 47 3 1 0
 
Source: World Bank (2006a). 




    1955-59 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79  1980-84
d 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
    
Exportables 
a, b -14.1 -23.7 -57.3 -49.6 -80.9 -83.2 -56.6 -36.2 -19.4 -19.6 
Cocoa  -14.1 -23.7 -57.3 -49.6 -80.9 -83.2 -56.6 -36.2 -30.9 -21.7 
    
Import-competing products 
a, b -12.1 -10.4 -13.6 0.3 0.1 40.2 69.4 33.2 13.2 35.8 
Rice  -6.3 -27.9 -36.9 -15.1 -21.3 26.6 79.6 21.7 10.9 30.9 
    
Nontradables 
a 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Yams  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Cassava  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Plantains  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
    
Mixed trade status 
a   
Maize  -14.2 -4.1 -1.3 6.7 21.3 56.2 66.1 38.5 3.8 39.0 
Groundnuts  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 14.4 -14.7 
    
Total of covered products 
a -7.0 -13.5 -28.2 -23.0 -41.0 -32.5 -8.3 -3.1 -4.6 -2.4 
Dispersion of covered products 
c   11.4 19.4 30.2 29.0 47.9 69.6 56.3 26.2 17.2 25.5 
% coverage (at undistorted prices)  73 73 74 69 66 71 82 77 78 80 
 
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet 
a. Weighted averages, with weights based on the unassisted value of production.  
b. Mixed trade status products included in exportable or import-competing groups depending on their trade status in the particular year.  
c. Dispersion is a simple 5-year average of the annual standard deviation around the weighted mean of NRAs of covered products. 








    1955-59 1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79  1980-84
c 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
Covered products  -7.0 -13.5 -28.2 -23.0 -41.0 -32.5 -8.3 -3.1 -4.6 -2.4 
Non-covered products   2.7 3.2 3.6 3.2 3.5 3.2 3.4 2.7 2.6 2.6 
All agricultural products  -4.4 -9.0 -19.8 -14.9 -25.6 -21.2 -6.3 -1.7 -3.0 -1.4 
Trade bias index
a -0.22 -0.34 -0.59 -0.53 -0.79 -0.84 -0.69 -0.46 -0.32 -0.37 
    
Assistance to just tradables:    
   NRA, all agricultural tradables  -9.3 -16.6 -38.8 -28.9 -50.2 -39.9 -17.3 -5.7 -8.8 -3.3 
   NRA, all non-agricultural tradables  3.7 1.5 -0.3 2.7 -5.5 -0.1 1.0 3.8 3.4 5.2 
Relative rate of assistance, RRA
b -12.5 -18.0 -38.4 -30.8 -47.5 -39.3 -18.7 -9.2 -11.7 -8.0 
    
MEMO, ignoring exchange rate 
distortions:    
  NRA, all agricultural products  -3.4 -1.1 -8.6 -10.6 -8.2 -0.7 -0.7 -1.4 -2.9 -1.4 
  Trade bias index
a -0.19 -0.11 -0.22 -0.39 -0.42 0.05 -0.53 -0.44 -0.31 -0.37 
  RRA (relative rate of assistance)
b -10.9 -6.2 -21.9 -25.4 -24.5 -5.4 -7.3 -8.5 -11.6 -8.0 
 
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet 
 
a. Trade bias index is TBI = (1+NRAagx/100)/(1+NRAagm/100) – 1, where NRAagm and NRAagx are the average percentage NRAs for the 
import-competing and exportable parts of the agricultural sector. 




t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables 
parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, respectively.  
c. Data for 1983 are omitted because they are unreliable 




Quantity data for agricultural products 
 
For all products (cocoa beans, maize, rice, groundnuts, cassava, yams and plantains) quantity 
data are taken from FAOSTAT. Apparent consumption is equal to output plus imports minus 
exports plus the change in stocks. 
 
Farm-gate product prices  
 
The producer price for cocoa beans is obtained from COCOBOD. 
For all other crops, producer prices are derived from wholesale prices. 
•  Maize (1955-2004): Stryker’s wholesale/farm-gate margins are used until 1985; a 
2004 MOFA survey margin of 33% is applied for that year, and adjusted for previous 
years by the CPI such that it converges on the 1985 estimate. 
•  Rice (1955-2004): Stryker’s wholesale/farm-gate margins are used until 1985; these 
are then increased by the CPI, anchored on MOFA survey estimate for 2004. 
•  Groundnuts (1963-2004): a constant margin of 20% is assumed, based on 2004 
MOFA estimate. 
•  Cassava (1963-2004): 30% wholesale/farm-gate margin, based on Techiman-Accra 
estimate (MOFA). 
•  Yams (1955-2004): 21% wholesale/farm-gate margin, based on Techiman-Accra 
estimate (MOFA). 
•  Plantains (1970-2004): 18% wholesale/farm-gate margin, based on Techiman-Accra 
estimate (MOFA). 
 
Wholesale product prices  
 
There are no wholesale prices for cocoa beans. All other wholesale prices are taken from 
MOFA. 
 
Border prices  
 
•  For cocoa beans, the f.o.b. price is taken to be the quoted price of Ghanaian cocoa in 
New York and London. On average, this price corresponds to the export unit value 
reported by COMTRADE. 
•  For maize, the US f.o.b. price of yellow maize (IMF, IFS) is used and a constant 1.4 
c.i.f./f.o.b. ratio is applied, based on the estimates of a broker. 
•  For rice, the Thai f.o.b. price for 5% broken rice is used (IMF, IFS), with a 1.4 
c.i.f./f.o.b. ratio used. 
•  For groundnuts, the Nigerian f.o.b. price is used (IMF, IFS). For each year, this is 
multiplied by the average ratio of Ghana’s export unit value (COMTRADE) to the 




Official exchange rates are from IMF International Financial Statistics. 
Black market exchange rate taken from the compilation of Easterly (2006).   35
The parallel exchange rate is assumed to be the black market rate in those years when a black 
market premium existed. Exporters of cocoa beans are assumed to have been able to convert 
half their foreign currency earnings into cedis at the black market rate. 
 
 
List of data sources 
 
COCOBOD (2006), Cocoa Beans Production and Prices. Posted at 
http://www.cocobod.gh/cocoa_beans_prod.cfm 
COMTRADE (2006), United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database. Posted at 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/comtrade/. 
Easterly, W. (2006), Global Development Network Growth Database, accessed 23 June 
http://www.nyu.edu/fas/institute/dri/global%20development%20network%20growth%
20database.htm 
FAOSTAT (2006), Food and Agriculture Organization Statistics Databases. Available at: 
//faostat.fao.org. Accessed 1 Oct 2006. 
FAO (1996), Trade Yearbook 1996, Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization. 
International Currency Analysis (1993 and earlier years), World Currency Yearbook 
(formerly Pick’s Currency Yearbook), Brooklyn NY: International Currency Analysis, 
Inc. 
IMF (2005 and earlier years), Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions: Annual 
Report, Washington DC: International Monetary Fund (available back to 1950). 
IMF (2006 and earlier years), International Financial Statistics, Washington DC: 
International Monetary Fund (annual). 
Stryker, J.D., 1990, Trade, Exchange Rate, and Agricultural Pricing Policies in Ghana, 
World Bank Comparative Studies, The World Bank, Washington, D.C. 
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Source: World Bank (2006a). 
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Official development assistance and official aid (current US$) -LHS
Offical Development Assistance as a percentage of government final
expenditure (%) - RHS
 
Source: World Bank (2006a). 
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Agriculture, value added (% of GDP), left axis 
Agriculture, value added (annual % growth), 
right axis
 
Source: World Bank (2006a). 
  40  41
Appendix Figure 6: Cocoa beans prices, Ghana, 1955 to 2004 
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Note that the export tax is calculated by dividing COCOBOD payments by the number of tonnes produced that 
year. The timing of payments may not correspond to the precise dates for which duties were applicable, so the 
series may not be perfectly comparable with the two price series. 
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Appendix Figure 6 (cont’d): Cocoa beans prices, Ghana, 1955 to 2004 
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Appendix Figure 7: Rice prices, Ghana, 1955 to 2004 
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Appendix Figure 8: Maize prices, Ghana, 1955 to 2004 
 







































(b) Cedis per MT 
 
(a) US dollars per MT 
 





























FOB priceAppendix Table 1: Economic growth in Ghana and Sub-Saharan Africa, 1961 to 2004 
Country/sub-region Economic  Indicator  1966-1970 1971-1975 1976-1980  1981-1985 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2004 
Ghana  GDP growth (annual percent)  3.0  0.0  1.0  -0.3  4.8 4.3 4.3 4.9 
  GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$)  262  276  238  196  205 222 242 266 
  GDP per capita growth (annual percent)  1.1  -2.6  -0.9  -3.6  1.8 1.5 2.0 2.7 
  Inflation, consumer prices (annual percent)  4.6  17.1  70.0  62.3  31.6 27.5 25.3 21.8 
Sub-Saharan Africa  GDP growth (annual percent)  4.7  4.3  3.1  1.2  2.6 1.2 3.4 3.9 
  GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$)  502  566  575  547  524 489 500 521 
  GDP per capita growth (annual percent)  2.0  1.5  0.1  -1.7  -0.3  -1.4 0.8 1.6 
Source: World Bank (2006a). Appendix Table 2: Food poverty incidence by location, region and at the national level, 
Ghana, 1991/92 and 1998/99 
 
Poverty Index % Contribution to 
National Poverty
Poverty Index % Contribution to 
National Poverty
Location
Urban 15.1 13.7 11.6 14.4
Rural 47.2 86.3 34.4 85.6
Region
Western 42 11.7 13.6 5.9
Central 24.1 6.8 31.5 10.5
Greater Accra 13.4 4.3 2.4 1.1
Eastern 34.8 12.3 30.4 13.2
Volta 42.1 10.4 20.4 9.5
Ashanti 25.5 11.1 16.4 10.3
Brong Ahafo 45.9 14.9 18.8 6.1
Northern 54.1 14 57.4 21.9
Upper West 74.3 6.4 68.3 8.2
Upper East 53.5 8.2 79.6 13.4
National 36.5 100 26.8 100
1991/92 1998/99
 
Source: Ghana Statistical Service (2000a).   48
Appendix Table 3: Poverty incidence by employment category, Ghana, 1991/92 and 1998/99 
 
Poverty Index % Contribution to 
National Poverty
Poverty Index % Contribution to 
National Poverty
Economic Activity
Public sector  21.2 7.9 9.5 3.8
Private formal sector 15.1 1.6 4.5 0.8
Private informal sector 22.5 1.9 16.1 1.7
Export farmers 49.6 8.5 19.4 5.1
Food crop farmers 51.8 61.7 45 64.6
Non-farm self employment 23.3 17.7 18.1 22.8
Non-working 13 0.7 15.1 1.2
1991/92 1998/99
Source: Ghana Statistical Service (2000a). 
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Appendix Table 4: Prices for primary products, Ghana, 1960 to 2005 
 
NRA =  NRA = NRA =
DP-BP  DP-BP DP-BP
BP  BP BP 
1955  474 
     
                      502  -0.06                      47                       58  -0.19                    135                     147  -0.08
1956  479 
     
502 








     
-0.03
1957  474 
     
502 








     
-0.03
1958  491 
     
723 








     
-0.09
1959  461 
     
597 








     
-0.09
1960  369 
     
437 








     
-0.17
1961  351 
     
356 








     
-0.25
1962  346 
     
464 








     
-0.54
1963  363 
     
577 








     
-0.12
1964  354 
     
578 








     
-0.32
1965  329 
     
586 








     
-0.29
1966  268 
     
652 








     
-0.25
1967  328 
     
745 








     
-0.43
1968  422 
     
1,149 








     
-0.55
1969  477 
     
1,341 








     
-0.33
1970  466 
     
1,029 








     
-0.19
1971  433 
     
557 








     
0.35
1972  508 
     
997 








     
0.05
1973  696 
     
1,811 








     
-0.38
1974  890 
     
2,250 








     
-0.58
1975  909 
     
2,156 








     
-0.30
1976  1,176 
     
7,262 








     
0.00
1977  1,825 
     
22,973 








     
-0.22
1978  2,834 
     
17,876 








     
-0.07
1979  4,931 
     
37,555 








     
-0.48
1980  5,790 
     
23,483 








     
0.05
1981  5,428 
     
79,298 








     
-0.56
1982  13,197 
     
157,961 








     
-0.50
1983  16,677 
     
50,044 








     
5.57
1984  41,553 
     
150,873 








     
2.07
1985  60,642 
     
252,574 








     
0.53
1986  102,725 
     
381,301 








     
0.21
1987  161,780 
     
373,759 








     
0.87
1988  230,116 
     
404,227 








     
0.94
1989  248,849 
     
378,534 








     
1.43
1990  277,847 
     
447,313 








     
0.40
1991  333,670 
     
451,502 








     
0.23
1992  371,336 
     
492,495 








     
0.25
1993  438,321 
     
735,122 








     
0.24
1994  641,816 
     
1,335,262 








     
-0.04
1995  1,129,916 
     
1,719,664 








     
0.01
1996  1,398,762 
     
2,261,860 








     
0.01
1997  1,948,071 
     
3,025,668 








     
0.18
1998  2,761,477 
     
3,845,909 








     
0.10
1999  3,244,448 
     
3,977,791 








     
0.24
2000  3,785,736 
     
6,142,943 








     
0.08
2001  5,228,520 
     
7,014,079 








     
0.47
2002  8,500,483 
     
9,201,932 








     
0.30
2003  12,626,003 
     
16,504,011 








     
0.33
2004  12,655,272 
     
14,621,088 
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Appendix Table 4 (cont’d): Prices for primary products, Ghana, 1960 to 2005 
 
NRA = NRA = NRA =
DP-BP DP-BP DP-BP
BP BP BP
1955  n.a.  90               n.a.  n.a.   n.a.   n.a.                        90   n.a.   n.a. 
1956 n.a. 99               n.a. n.a.  n.a.   n.a.  96                        n.a.   n.a. 
1957 n.a. 96               n.a. n.a.  n.a.   n.a.  90                        n.a.   n.a. 
1958 n.a. 79               n.a. n.a.  n.a.   n.a.  99                        n.a.   n.a. 
1959 n.a. 86               n.a. n.a.  n.a.   n.a.  93                        n.a.   n.a. 
1960 n.a. 94               n.a. n.a.  n.a.   n.a.  94                        n.a.   n.a. 
1961 n.a. 92               n.a. n.a.  n.a.   n.a.  94                        n.a.   n.a. 
1962 n.a. 111             n.a. n.a.  n.a.   n.a.  102                      n.a.   n.a. 
1963 166                     115             n.a. 28                    n.a.   n.a.  91                        n.a.   n.a. 
1964 202                     137             n.a. 29                    n.a.   n.a.  96                        n.a.   n.a. 
1965 284                     212             n.a. 48                    n.a.   n.a.  117                      n.a.   n.a. 
1966 229                     150             n.a. 44                    n.a.   n.a.  132                      n.a.   n.a. 
1967 191                     143             n.a. 34                    n.a.   n.a.  115                      n.a.   n.a. 
1968 247                     169             n.a. 35                    n.a.   n.a.  122                      n.a.   n.a. 
1969 269                     196             n.a. 44                    n.a.   n.a.  136                      n.a.   n.a. 
1970 288                     223             n.a. 43                    n.a.   n.a.  139                      n.a.   n.a. 
1971 279                     166             n.a. 54                    n.a.   n.a.  155                      n.a.   n.a. 
1972 312                     252             n.a. 64                    n.a.   n.a.  177                      n.a.   n.a. 
1973 434                     401             n.a. 67                    n.a.   n.a.  218                      n.a.   n.a. 
1974 545                     682             n.a. 80                    n.a.   n.a.  279                      n.a.   n.a. 
1975 652                     479             n.a. 122                  n.a.   n.a.  381                      n.a.   n.a. 
1976 1,234                  960             n.a. 252                  n.a.   n.a.  552                      n.a.   n.a. 
1977 2,369                  2,119          n.a. 653                  n.a.   n.a.  1,164                   n.a.   n.a. 
1978 3,913                  2,119          n.a. 608                  n.a.   n.a.  1,886                   n.a.   n.a. 
1979 5,782                  4,105          n.a. 720                  n.a.   n.a.  2,340                   n.a.   n.a. 
1980 8,416                  7,992          n.a. 1,518               n.a.   n.a.  3,829                   n.a.   n.a. 
1981 18,122                34,634        n.a. 3,730               n.a.   n.a.  6,179                   n.a.   n.a. 
1982 28,917                54,128        n.a. 4,203               n.a.   n.a.  8,625                   n.a.   n.a. 
1983 72,140                16,446        n.a. 16,450             n.a.   n.a.  28,078                 n.a.   n.a. 
1984 74,558                38,001        n.a. 9,296               n.a.   n.a.  27,842                 n.a.   n.a. 
1985 72,463                55,523        n.a. 8,731               n.a.   n.a.  27,253                 n.a.   n.a. 
1986 93,795                100,890      n.a. 15,482             n.a.   n.a.  36,047                 n.a.   n.a. 
1987 121,150              71,247        n.a. 34,992             n.a.   n.a.  43,075                 n.a.   n.a. 
1988 146,588              104,593      n.a. 17,638             n.a.   n.a.  77,546                 n.a.   n.a. 
1989 196,588              153,674      n.a. 27,264             n.a.   n.a.  94,399                 n.a.   n.a. 
1990 210,456              240,402      n.a. 48,713             n.a.   n.a.  120,409               n.a.   n.a. 
1991 249,492              258,936      n.a. 43,956             n.a.   n.a.  117,877               n.a.   n.a. 
1992 316,744              186,022      n.a. 44,479             n.a.   n.a.  116,281               n.a.   n.a. 
1993 375,999              392,452      n.a. 59,574             n.a.   n.a.  160,393               n.a.   n.a. 
1994 421,662              563,537      n.a. 63,001             n.a.   n.a.  213,241               n.a.   n.a. 
1995 662,753              626,976      n.a. 104,947           n.a.   n.a.  328,874               n.a.   n.a. 
1996 841,768              858,421      -0.02 113,069           n.a.   n.a.  389,947               n.a.   n.a. 
1997 1,399,693           1,159,022   0.21 174,484           n.a.   n.a.  568,343               n.a.   n.a. 
1998 1,678,501           1,176,741   0.43 309,453           n.a.   n.a.  958,146               n.a.   n.a. 
1999 1,438,266           1,301,921   0.10 211,377           n.a.   n.a.  665,735               n.a.   n.a. 
2000 1,309,847           2,740,432   -0.52 371,398          n.a. n.a.  861,137               n.a.   n.a. 
2001 3,711,702           3,454,395   0.07 887,984        n.a. n.a.  1,429,998          n.a.   n.a. 
2002 3,145,012           3,322,643   -0.05 710,819          n.a. n.a.  1,680,016            n.a.   n.a. 
2003 4,177,397           4,749,839   -0.12 632,214          n.a. n.a.  1,854,283            n.a.   n.a. 
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1955  n.a.   n.a.   n.a. 
1956  n.a.   n.a.   n.a. 
1957  n.a.   n.a.   n.a. 
1958  n.a.   n.a.   n.a. 
1959  n.a.   n.a.   n.a. 
1960  n.a.   n.a.   n.a. 
1961  n.a.   n.a.   n.a. 
1962  n.a.   n.a.   n.a. 
1963  n.a.   n.a.   n.a. 
1964  n.a.   n.a.   n.a. 
1965  n.a.   n.a.   n.a. 
1966  n.a.   n.a.   n.a. 
1967  n.a.   n.a.   n.a. 
1968  n.a.   n.a.   n.a. 
1969  n.a.   n.a.   n.a. 
1970                  35   n.a.   n.a. 
1971                  55   n.a.   n.a. 
1972                  46   n.a.   n.a. 
1973                  67   n.a.   n.a. 
1974                  73   n.a.   n.a. 
1975                  92   n.a.   n.a. 
1976                189   n.a.   n.a. 
1977                556   n.a.   n.a. 
1978                822   n.a.   n.a. 
1979                903   n.a.   n.a. 
1980             1,355   n.a.   n.a. 
1981             2,042   n.a.   n.a. 
1982             2,818   n.a.   n.a. 
1983           11,948   n.a.   n.a. 
1984           13,036   n.a.   n.a. 
1985           13,505   n.a.   n.a. 
1986           14,906   n.a.   n.a. 
1987           28,297   n.a.   n.a. 
1988           32,318   n.a.   n.a. 
1989           43,328   n.a.   n.a. 
1990           71,615   n.a.   n.a. 
1991           55,417   n.a.   n.a. 
1992           66,833   n.a.   n.a. 
1993         100,646   n.a.   n.a. 
1994         121,245   n.a.   n.a. 
1995         259,969   n.a.   n.a. 
1996         230,813   n.a.   n.a. 
1997         408,599   n.a.   n.a. 
1998         514,917   n.a.   n.a. 
1999         382,729   n.a.   n.a. 
2000         873,630   n.a.   n.a. 
2001      1,409,161   n.a.   n.a. 
2002      1,066,307   n.a.   n.a. 
2003      1,199,281   n.a.   n.a. 








Source: Authors’ spreadsheet  
Note. NRA set to zero for maize in 1996-99 (when exported), for groundnuts prior to 1996 
(when not traded). 
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Appendix Table 5: Exchange rate, Ghana, 1960 to 2005 
 




rate (add if 
necessary)
1955 0.71 n.a. 0.75 0.5 0.05 0.74
1956 0.71 n.a. 0.75 0.5 0.05 0.74
1957 0.71 n.a. 0.75 0.5 0.05 0.74
1958 0.71 n.a. 0.75 0.5 0.05 0.74
1959 0.71 n.a. 0.75 0.5 0.05 0.74
1960 0.71 n.a. 0.75 0.5 0.05 0.74
1961 0.71 n.a. 0.74 0.5 0.03 0.73
1962 0.71 n.a. 1.11 0.5 0.36 1.01
1963 0.71 n.a. 1.16 0.5 0.38 1.05
1964 0.71 n.a. 1.29 0.5 0.45 1.15
1965 0.71 n.a. 1.90 0.5 0.62 1.60
1966 0.71 n.a. 1.44 0.5 0.50 1.26
1967 0.87 n.a. 1.37 0.5 0.37 1.25
1968 1.02 n.a. 1.79 0.5 0.43 1.59
1969 1.02 n.a. 1.64 0.5 0.38 1.48
1970 1.02 n.a. 1.69 0.5 0.40 1.53
1971 1.03 n.a. 1.03 0.5 0.00 1.03
1972 1.33 n.a. 1.63 0.5 0.18 1.55
1973 1.17 n.a. 1.75 0.5 0.33 1.60
1974 1.15 n.a. 1.54 0.5 0.25 1.44
1975 1.15 n.a. 1.92 0.5 0.40 1.73
1976 1.15 n.a. 4.35 0.5 0.74 3.55
1977 1.15 n.a. 7.70 0.5 0.85 6.06
1978 1.76 n.a. 6.41 0.5 0.73 5.25
1979 2.75 n.a. 14.29 0.5 0.81 11.41
1980 2.75 n.a. 11.11 0.5 0.75 9.02
1981 2.75 n.a. 50.00 0.5 0.94 38.19
1982 2.75 n.a. 120.00 0.5 0.98 90.69
1983 8.83 n.a. 28.55 0.5 0.69 23.62
1984 35.99 n.a. 71.97 0.5 0.50 62.98
1985 54.37 n.a. 131.25 0.5 0.59 112.03
1986 89.20 n.a. 216.07 0.5 0.59 184.35
1987 153.73 n.a. 198.21 0.5 0.22 187.09
1988 202.35 n.a. 272.86 0.5 0.26 255.23
1989 270.00 n.a. 316.31 0.5 0.15 304.73
1990 326.33 n.a. 361.58 0.5 0.10 352.77
1991 367.83 n.a. 382.17 0.5 0.04 378.58
1992 437.09 n.a. 451.58 0.5 0.03 447.96
1993 649.06 n.a. 665.67 0.5 0.02 661.52
1994 956.71 n.a. 956.71 0.5 0.00 956.71
1995 1200.43 n.a. 1200.43 0.5 0.00 1200.43
1996 1637.23 n.a. 1663.42 0.5 0.02 1656.87
1997 2050.17 n.a. 2080.67 0.5 0.01 2073.04
1998 2314.15 n.a. 2314.15 0.5 0.00 2314.15
1999 2669.30 n.a. 2669.30 0.5 0.00 2669.30
2000 5455.06 n.a. 5455.06 0.5 0.00 5455.06
2001 7170.76 n.a. 7170.76 0.5 0.00 7170.76
2002 7932.70 n.a. 7932.70 0.5 0.00 7932.70
2003 8677.37 n.a. 8677.37 0.5 0.00 8677.37



















a  The proportion of foreign currency actually sold by all exporters at the parallel market rate. 
b  See Anderson et al. (2008) on the exchange rate methodology used in this study  
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Appendix Table 6: Annual distortion estimates, Ghana, 1955 to 2004 
(a) Nominal rates of assistance to covered products   
(percent) 
   Cassava  Cocoa 
Groundnu
t Maize  Plantain  Rice  Yam 
All 
covered  
1955 0  -6 0  -19 0  -8 0  -3 
1956  0 -5  0 -2  0 -3  0 -2 
1957 0  -6 0  -34 0  -3 0  -3 
1958 0  -32 0 3 0  -9 0  -15 
1959 0  -23 0  -18 0  -9 0  -12 
1960  0 -15  0 -18  0 -17  0  -8 
1961 0  -1 0  27 0  -25 0 0 
1962  0 -25  0 -11  0 -54  0 -14 
1963  0 -37  0 -15  0 -12  0 -21 
1964 0  -39 0  -2 0  -32 0  -24 
1965 0  -44 0  -6 0  -29 0  -22 
1966 0  -59 0 8 0  -25 0  -25 
1967  0 -56  0 -38  0 -43  0 -30 
1968 0  -63 0  -8 0  -55 0  -32 
1969 0  -64 0  38 0  -33 0  -32 
1970 0  -55 0  -6 0  -19 0  -28 
1971 0  -22 0  41 0  35 0  -6 
1972 0  -49 0  38 0 5 0  -19 
1973  0 -62  0 -16  0 -38  0 -31 
1974  0 -60  0 -23  0 -58  0 -31 
1975  0 -58  0 -14  0 -30  0 -27 
1976 0  -84 0 2 0 0 0  -43 
1977 0  -92 0  47 0  -22 0  -47 
1978 0  -84 0  81 0  -7 0  -35 
1979  0 -87  0 -10  0 -48  0 -53 
1980 0  -75 0  161 0 5 0  -23 
1981 0  -93 0  11 0  -56 0  -46 
1982  0 -92  0 -42  0 -50  0 -59 
1983 na na na na na na na na 
1984 0  -72 0  95 0  207 0  -1 
1985 0  -76 0  18 0  53 0  -18 
1986 0  -73 0  46 0  21 0  -19 
1987 0  -57 0  172 0  87 0  -1 
1988 0  -43 0  79 0  94 0  -1 
1989 0  -34 0  14 0  143 0  -3 
1990 0  -38 0  60 0  40 0  -4 
1991 0  -26 0  66 0  23 0 1 
1992 0  -25 0  54 0  25 0  -1 
1993 0  -40 0  17 0  24 0  -3 
1994 0  -52 0  -4 0  -4 0  -9 
1995 0  -34 0  19 0 1 0  -5 
1996 0  -38  -2 0 0 1 0  -8 
1997 0  -36  21 0 0  18 0  -4 
1998 0  -28  43 0 0  10 0  -3 
1999 0  -18  10 0 0  24 0  -3 
2000 0  -38  -52  39 0 8 0  -7 
2001 0  -25 7  67 0  47 0 1 
2002  0 -8 -5 22  0 30  0  1 
2003  0  -23  -12 17  0 33  0 -5 
2004  0  -13  -12 50  0 37  0 -1 
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Appendix Table 6 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, Ghana, 1955 to 2004  
(b) Nominal and relative rates of assistance to all
a agricultural products, to exportable
b and 
import-competing
 b agricultural industries, and relative
c to non-agricultural industries   
   (percent) 
Total ag NRA  Ag tradables NRA 
Covered products 














1955 0  -3 3 -1 -7 7 -3 4  -7 
1956 0  -2 3 -1 -6 13 -2 2  -4 
1957 0  -3 3 -2 -7 4 -4 3  -7 
1958 0  -15 3 -10 -31 14 -21 5  -25 
1959 0  -12 3 -8 -23 10 -16 4  -20 
1960 0  -8 3 -5 -16 10 -11 4  -14 
1961 0  0 3  1- 3 1 92 4   - 2  
1962 0  -14 3 -9 -26 13 -18 1  -19 
1963 0  -21 4 -14 -36 16 -27 -1  -26 
1964 0  -24 4 -16 -38 19 -29 0  -28 
1965 0  -22 4 -15 -43 18 -30 -6  -25 
1966 0  -25 4 -17 -56 18 -35 0  -35 
1967 0  -30 4 -22 -53 -5 -42 0  -42 
1968 0  -32 4 -23 -60 1 -44 3  -46 
1969 0  -32 4 -22 -61 23 -42 2  -44 
1970 0  -28 4 -19 -52 12 -35 -4  -32 
1971 0  -6 3 -3 -22 28 -7 5  -11 
1972 0  -19 3 -12 -46 27 -24 6  -28 
1973 0  -31 3 -20 -57 1 -38 6  -41 
1974 0  -31 3 -21 -56 -10 -40 1  -41 
1975 0  -27 4 -18 -54 7 -37 0  -37 
1976 0  -43 4 -27 -77 26 -52 -3  -51 
1977 0  -47 3 -30 -85 37 -58 -10  -54 
1978 0  -35 4 -22 -76 40 -49 -10  -43 
1979 0  -53 3 -30 -79 26 -55 -6  -52 
1980 0  -23 4 -14 -68 69 -32 -3  -29 
1981 0  -46 3 -32 -87 15 -61 1  -61 
1982 0  -59 3 -38 -85 10 -65 4  -67 
1983 na  na na na na na na na  na 
1984 0  -1 4 -1 -65 84 -2 -2  0 
1985 0  -18 4 -14 -72 31 -41 -5  -38 
1986 0  -19 4 -15 -69 41 -40 -1  -39 
1987 0  -1 3 0 -52 90 0 3  -3 
1988 0  -1 3 0 -41 67 0 5  -5 
1989 0  -3 3 -2 -33 39 -5 4  -9 
1990 0  -4 3 -2 -35 39 -7 3  -11 
1991 0  1 3 2 -25 37 7 4  2 
1992 0  -1 3 0 -24 32 1 4  -3 
1993 0  -3 3 -2 -36 20 -7 3  -10 
1994 0  -9 3 -6 -46 5 -21 4  -24 
1995 0  -5 3 -4 -32 16 -12 4  -15 
1996 0  -8 3 -5 -24 13 -14 3  -17 
1997 0  -4 3 -2 -15 20 -7 3  -10 
1998 0  -3 3 -2 -13 18 -6 4  -9 
1999 0  -3 3 -2 -13 21 -5 3  -8 
2000 0  -7 3 -5 -39 24 -15 7  -20 
2001 0  1 3 2 -17 41 6 8  -2 
2002 0  1 3  1- 8 2 23 4   - 1  
2003 0  -5 3 -4 -21 21 -9 3  -12 
2004 0  -1 3 -1 -14 33 -2 3  -5 
a. NRAs including assistance to nontradables and non-product specific assistance.
 
b. NRAs including products specific input subsidies.  





t are the percentage NRAs for the 
tradables parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, respectively.  
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Appendix Table 6 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, Ghana, 1955 to 2004 
(c) Value shares of primary production of covered
a and non-covered products,  
(percent) 
   Cassava  Cocoa 
Groundnu
t Maize  Plantain  Rice  Yam 
Non-
covered  
1955  6 28  2  3 6 1 27 27 
1956  6 30  2  3 5 1 26 27 
1957  7 27  2  3 6 1 28 27 
1958  5 33  2  2 5 1 25 27 
1959  5 36  2  2 5 1 23 27 
1960  5 36  1  2 5 1 23 27 
1961  6 32  2  2 5 1 25 27 
1962  5 37  1  3 4 1 22 27 
1963  5 40  1  2 4 1 18 27 
1964  5 44  1  2 3 1 16 27 
1965  9 36  1  3 4 1 19 27 
1966  10 31  1  6 4 1 18 27 
1967  8 35  1  4 4 3 20 26 
1968  6 34  2  4 4 3 20 26 
1969  7 37  2  3 4 2 19 27 
1970  7 35  3  6 4 1 14 30 
1971  10 28  4  4 6 1 18 30 
1972  10 30  3  5 4 2 13 32 
1973  8 31  4  7 5 3 12 32 
1974  7 30  5  7 4 4 14 30 
1975  10 31  4  4 6 3 13 30 
1976  10 34  3  4 6 2 8 33 
1977  12 35  2  2 6 2 7 33 
1978  11 29  3  1 8 2 11 35 
1979  6 35  3  3 4 1 7 40 
1980  12 26  6  3 5 1 12 35 
1981  14 34  4  5 3 3 7 29 
1982  9 40  4  5 3 1 6 33 
1983  na na na na na na na na 
1984  15 12 10  6 13 1 26 17 
1985  14 22  8  5 14 1 20 16 
1986  19 26  8  5 7 1 17 17 
1987  28 14  7  4 10 1 16 19 
1988  14 21  9  7 10 3 18 17 
1989  16 17  7  5 9 2 22 21 
1990  21 17  4  4 10 2 18 24 
1991  23 9 2 4 7 2 30  23 
1992  23 12  3  4 7 2 26 24 
1993  22 9 4 5 9 2 29  21 
1994  20 13  4  6 10 3 21 23 
1995  19 15  3  5 13 3 21 21 
1996  18 16  3  6 10 4 21 23 
1997  18 11  3  9 12 2 21 24 
1998  21 12  3  5 10 2 26 22 
1999  18 17  3  4 9 2 25 23 
2000  20 14  4  4 12 2 21 22 
2001  31 9 4 3 12 2 21  18 
2002  24 10  7  5 9 2 25 18 
2003  18 20  6  4 9 2 21 21 
2004  18 22  5  4 9 2 20 21 
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet 
a. At farmgate undistorted prices 
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